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Abstract 
 
Malta has been transformed in many ways with and by EU Membership. This paper goes beyond the 
more obvious impacts of ‘Europeanisation’ and instead reviews the implications of an explosion of 
multi-level governance on doing politics in Malta. While for most of its recent political history, there 
has been a clawing back of power by the central government – as when the Gozo Civic Council 
(1960-1973), an early foray into regional government, was “unceremoniously dissolved” in 1973  – 
this trend was reversed with the setting up of local councils as from 1994, an advisory Malta Council 
for Economic and Social Development (MCESD) in 2001, and then EU membership in 2004. These 
events have created a profligacy of decision-making tiers and multiplied the tensions that exist 
between different levels of governance in this small archipelago state. Malta has never experienced 
such pluralism before. In fact, since 1966, only two political parties have been represented in the 
national legislature and, therefore, there has been no division of powers between the executive and 
the national parliament. This paper reviews the implications of these developments on two hot 
political issues in 2014:  the International Investor Programme (IIP) proposed by the Labour 
Government in its 2014 Budget; and the location of a Liquid Natural Gas (LNG)-storage vessel inside 
Marsaxlokk harbour. 
 
Keywords: democratisation; europeanisation; individual investment scheme; liquid natural gas 
tanker; Malta; multi-level governance; state; total politics 
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Malta transformed 
by multi-level 
governance: more 
than just an 
outcome of 
Europeanisation 
by Godfrey Baldacchino 
Introduction 
The concept of multi-level governance (MLG) 
gives expression to the idea that there are 
many interacting authority structures at work 
in the emergent global political economy. It is 
an approach in political science and public 
administration theory that has emerged from 
studies on European integration, and 
particularly from the various structures that 
were introduced by and in the EU via the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992).1 Multi-level 
governance refers to the deep and messy 
entanglement between various domestic, 
local, regional and international levels of 
authority. MLG is a dynamic 
three‐dimensional concept that blurs and 
renders problematic three analytical 
distinctions that have hitherto been central to 
                                                          
1
 L. Hooghe and G. Marks (2003), ‘Unravelling the 
central state, but how? Types of multi-level 
governance’, American Political Science Review, 
97(2), 233-243. 
the conventional understanding of the 
contemporary European state: (1) that 
between centre and periphery, (2) that 
between state and society, and (3) that 
between the domestic and the international.2 
 
This chapter highlights the radical changes 
that have taken place in Malta since the 
period 1974-1994, when a de facto absolutist 
form of government was in power, in spite of 
the de iure framework of institutional 
democracy. Two case studies drawn from 
recent events – the International Investor 
Programme (IIP) proposed by the Labour 
Government in its 2014 Budget; and the 
location of a Liquid Natural Gas (LNG)-storage 
vessel inside Marsaxlokk harbour – are 
proposed and deployed to illustrate the 
increasing complexity of doing politics in 
Malta. 
Doing politics in Malta 
Doing federal politics was one of Malta’s 
obviously new experiences since joining the 
European Union. The notion of pooled 
sovereignty meant that, in spite of its small 
size, Malta was expected and encouraged to 
participate in the many decision-making and 
consultative organs of the European Union. 
Amongst the most notable is the European 
Parliament (EP), where Malta now has six 
representatives, the best per capita 
                                                          
2
 S. Piattoni (2009), ‘Multi‐level governance: a 
historical and conceptual analysis’, European 
Integration, 31(2), 163-180. 
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representation within the whole of the EU-28 
(one representative per 70,000 residents). 
Malta also has five representatives on 
ECOSOC, the EU's European Economic and 
Social Committee. 
 
Maltese elections to the EP, held in 2004, 
2009 and 2014, take on the guise of partisan 
contests, with the typical party rivalry that has 
come to characterise national (both general 
and local) elections. Such an intense and 
frenzied bipartisanship – whereby “politics 
has become a corrosive zero-sum contest 
characterised by factional loyalty that reaches 
a veritable frenzy just before elections”3 – is, 
however, a relatively recent historical 
phenomenon. It is only since 1966 that Malta 
has had only two political parties – the Labour 
Party (Partit Laburista, PL) and the Nationalist 
Party (Partit Nazzjonalista, PN), – winning all 
the seats in the national legislature, and 
therefore with the winning political party 
forming a majority government (albeit, on 
various times, with the slimmest, one-seat 
majority) without the need of securing any 
alliance or coalition.4 This is totally 
unprecedented in Europe today. Malta is, in 
fact, the only EU member state with a 
government formed by just one single 
political party, and enjoying a very strong 
                                                          
3
 J. Boissevain (1993), Saints and fireworks: 
Religion and politics in rural Malta, Valletta, Malta: 
Progress Press, p. 150 
4
 For an excellent on-line database of Malta 
election statistics, visit:  
http://www.um.edu.mt/projects/maltaelections  
majority of seats in Parliament: the current 
Labour Government, elected in March 2013, 
has 39 out of 69 seats. Various other smaller 
parties have contested each general election 
but none has managed (so far) to elect even 
one single representative to Parliament. 
Malta has “one of the purest two-party 
systems in the world”.5  
 
This exceptional situation has many 
ramifications. Amongst them, there is the 
absence of any obligation by that political 
party securing a majority of votes and seeking 
to govern to negotiate with other parties to 
secure a working parliamentary majority. It 
has also meant that politics in Malta has been 
total and ubiquitous: the winning party grabs 
everything; the opposition ends up with 
nothing: an “in and out politics”.6 The 
transfers of power after elections where the 
incumbent government loses out are rare, but 
dramatic experiences in the democratic yet 
quite absolute handover of power. There have 
only been five such events since political 
independence was secured in 1964: in June 
1971, May 1987, October 1996, September 
1998 and March 2013. 
 
Another consequence is that the two political 
parties assume ethno-national qualities. They, 
                                                          
5
 M. Cini (2002), ‘A divided nation: polarization and 
the two-party system in Malta’, South European 
Society & Politics, 7(1), 6-23. 
6
 J. Richards (1982), ‘Politics in small independent 
communities: conflict or consensus?’, Journal of 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 20(2), 155-
171. 
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their programmes and their supporters, have 
acted as clans, advancing their own 
interpretation of history, their own sense of 
justice and fairness, often within a socio-
political context where those who are not 
with you must be against you (and one in 
which I have struggled to maintain my own 
integrity). I have provocatively dared to 
describe Malta as a ‘nationless state’, given 
the high degree of partisan affiliation and 
mobilisation that has prevailed, resulting in a 
limited corpus of nationally-agreed historically 
significant events, individuals and other 
symbolic paraphernalia.7 This is so to the 
extent that, rather than risk alienating a 
considerable section of the populace, Malta 
has had not one but five national days since 
1988.8 
 
The existence of ‘total politics’ was all the 
more stark and extreme before 1994, the year 
when local councils were introduced in the 
Maltese Islands, introducing a municipal level 
of government for the first time in local 
history. In spite of an initial pledge to 
decentralise, democratise and depoliticise 
local councils, the practice has shown 
otherwise, with the PL and PN now officially 
fielding candidates for municipal elections in 
                                                          
7
 G. Baldacchino (2002), ‘A nationless state? Malta, 
national identity and the EU’, West European 
Politics, 25(4), 191-206. 
8
 The Editor (2009), ‘Should Malta have one 
national day?’, MaltaToday, Sunday March 29 
2009, at 
http://archive.maltatoday.com.mt/2009/03/29/t1
4.html   
all localities (the PL doing so after a few years 
supporting ‘independent candidates’). Over 
99% of those now elected to one of the 
hundreds of seats spread out over 68 local 
councils (54 in Malta and 14 in Gozo) are 
officially endorsed by the PL or PN. There is 
only one elected independent councillor.9 The 
only other political party to have had any of 
its candidates elected to a local council is the 
Alternattiva Demokratika (Democratic 
Alternative) party, currently with two seats. In 
this way, local councils have ended up 
consolidating the iron grip of local politics by 
the two main political parties, rather than 
offering a level of governance that could 
escape or avoid their ubiquity.10  
 
We should not be surprised that even with 
local councils in place for the past two 
decades, the central government remains the 
responsible authority for practically all 
services except local parks and museums; 
playing fields and open spaces; refuse 
collection; adult education; child care 
services; and the surfacing of local roads and, 
even in these policy areas, the central 
government (and nationally elected 
                                                          
9
  The Editor (2012), ‘Labour takes umbrage at new 
independent mayor, accuses PN of being ‘anti-
democratic’’, MaltaToday, Tuesday 7 August 2012, 
at 
http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/2
0160/labour-accuses-pn-of-being-anti-democratic-
20120807#.U8vLMLGamdw  
10
 See, for instance: Baldacchino, G. (2006), ‘Hands 
off local governance’, The Times of Malta, 
Wednesday January 25 2006, at 
http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/2006
0125/opinion/hands-off-local-governance.65365  
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politicians) are usually somehow involved 
anyway. Local councillors elected on a party 
ticket receive instructions from their party 
head office on how to vote, and so on. In this 
way, the local political arena has become a 
faithful reflection of the national one: and 
some 32 politicians elected to Parliament 
since 1996 have cut their teeth in local council 
politics.11 
 
There had not been any local government in 
Malta since the brief, thirteen-year stint of 
the Gozo Civic Council. Disregarded by the 
central government and thus rendered 
ineffective, it was wound up in 1973, and with 
hardly any popular or institutional appeals for 
its continuation. Otherwise, the only sort of 
local authority was the Catholic Church, 
effectively in charge of local affairs with the 
connivance of the colonial administrator 
under British rule. Thus, localities such as 
cities, towns, villages and hamlets had no 
secular identity; they operated as parishes, 
with the parish priest as the de facto mayor. 
This explains why many local councils simply 
took on the same boundaries as their parish 
when they were set up in 1994. 
 
Long periods of colonial rule had also 
acculturated the Maltese to operate within a 
political structure where local colonial 
                                                          
11
 The Editor (2014), Local Councils as Pathway to 
Parliament, at 
http://www.um.edu.mt/__data/assets/excel_doc/
0009/207387/tr-newpath.xls 
authorities were often mouthpieces for 
remote and distant policy makers, most 
recently in London. When the United Kingdom 
reviewed its foreign policy role after the Suez 
Crisis debacle in 1956, and decided that Malta 
was ‘surplus’ to its scaled down military 
interests, there were violent protests in 
Malta, the government resigned and the 
constitution was abrogated; but the decision 
in London was not revoked or amended. What 
had been a movement spearheaded by the 
Malta Labour Party seeking Malta’s full 
integration with(in) the United Kingdom 
became a drive for full political independence 
under the helm of a Nationalist Government, 
a status secured in 1964. With this change, 
suddenly, policy makers were now local. They 
were known, identifiable and accountable. 
The new Maltese sovereign state was ‘soft’, 
because decision makers were known; even 
too well-known.12 And, given an electoral 
system where a representative to a 
unicameral Parliament could be elected with 
about 3,000 votes, the game was set for a 
dynamic whereby voter and candidate made 
it their business to get to know each other; 
one offering loyalty and support at the ballot 
box in exchange for ‘favours’ received ... even 
if many of those favours were rights. A “spoils 
system” reminiscent of feudalism was set in 
place, in some respects carried over from the 
                                                          
12
 See G. Myrdal (1968), Asian drama: An inquiry 
into the poverty of nations, New York: Twentieth 
Century Fund; G. Hyden (1983), No shortcuts to 
progress: African development management in 
perspective, London: Heinemann.  
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time of the benign colonial administration, 
with politicians becoming gatekeepers of 
most public (and some private) goods:13 be 
that employment, access to state contracts, 
and petty things like having a light bulb 
installed on the street outside your house or 
buying a colour television set.14 Not everyone 
will know each other in Malta, but everyone 
will know someone who does; the country 
operates with a dense psycho-social 
atmosphere, where most are just one degree 
of separation from anyone else.15 Politics is 
not run by the media in Malta but remains 
very much a personal, and intimate, affair. No 
wonder voter turnout, especially at general 
elections, remains phenomenally high.16  
 
When the titular head of the state of Malta – 
until then Queen Elizabeth II – was changed in 
December 1974, and a Maltese become head 
of state in the context of a new republican 
constitution, the transformation to an 
                                                          
13
 See, for instance: P. E. Buker (2005), ‘The 
executive administrative style in Prince Edward 
Island: managerial and spoils politics’, in M. 
Howlett, L. Bernier and K. Brownsey (eds.), 
Executive styles in Canada: cabinet structures and 
leadership practices in Canadian government, 
Toronto ON: University of Toronto Press, pp. 111-
131. 
14
 I procured my own first colour television set in 
this way in 1987, just before the general election. 
It was paid for, but still required ‘political assent’. 
The company assembling colour TV sets in Malta at 
that time (Magruvision) was state owned. 
15
 See J. A. Barnes (1954), Class and committees in 
a Norwegian island parish. New York: Plenum 
Press. 
16
 W. Hirczy (1995), ‘Explaining near‐universal 
turnout: the case of Malta’, European Journal of 
Political Research, 27(2), 255-272. 
exclusively local central government was well 
nigh complete. The period 1974-1994 
witnessed an all-powerful machinery of 
government run by an all-powerful political 
party in absolute power, and the state had a 
monopoly on local radio and television 
broadcasts (until 1991), albeit in a democratic 
institutional framework where, however, 
omertà (collusion through silence and 
inaction) and the fear of retaliation was rife.17 
Dom Mintoff was Malta’s Prime Minister 
uninterruptedly for 10 out of those 20 
ominous years. A ‘big man’ politician, Mintoff 
would easily belong to that rare class of 
“larger-than-life politicians cum father-figures 
and folk heroes who exercise almost total 
control over decision making in a jurisdiction 
for many years, while the formal institutions 
of democracy struggled to persist.18 For 
almost six out of those years, Mintoff led a 
government that had a “spurious majority”:19 
a 50%+ majority of seats in Parliament when 
                                                          
17
 Boissevain, J. (2010), ‘Tourists, developers and 
civil society: on the commodification of Malta’s 
landscapes’, in J. Scott and T. Selwyn (eds.), 
Thinking through tourism, Oxford: Berg, pp. 93-
116, p. 100. 
18
 G. Baldacchino (2012), ‘Islands and despots’, 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 50(1), 103-
120, p. 109; 
J. V. Micallef (1979), ‘Mediterranean maverick: 
Malta’s uncertain future’, The Round Table: 
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 
69(275), 238-251; 
W. H. Wriggins (1975), ‘To the highest bidder: 
Malta, Britain and NATO’, The Round Table: 
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 
65(258), 167-185. 
19
 A. Siaroff (2003), ‘Spurious majorities, electoral 
systems and electoral system change’, 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 41(2), 143-
160. 
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the opposition party had a 50%+ majority of 
votes, leading to a parliamentary boycott and 
a crisis of legitimacy that risked descending 
into civil war. 
A proliferation of multi-level governance 
The situation in Malta today is very different 
from what prevailed in 1974-1994. And it 
would be naïve and simplistic to merely blame 
or attribute it to ‘Europeanisation’. 
Admittedly, accession to the EU is responsible 
for Malta’s foray into trans-national, federal 
politics. But other developments can perhaps 
be traced to Malta’s own indigenous 
evolution into a more mature, pluralist and 
democratic jurisdiction.  
 
With the additional layers and levels of 
government and governance, the political 
establishment has been engaged in a political 
terrain that is increasingly more cluttered and 
complex. In some departments, the party 
political class has managed to maintain, and 
even extend, its effective hegemony, as with 
the near total control over local council 
politics. In some others, the added layer 
merely provided an additional (supra-
national) platform for the promulgation of 
party politics, as perhaps participation in 
Brussels politics implies. But other initiatives 
are beyond and outside the remit of the state. 
Some civil society empowerment has been 
effectively co-opted and curtailed, as with the 
setting up of the advisory Malta Council for 
Economic and Social Development (MCESD) 
and its ‘civil society committee’. But for those 
bodies operating completely beyond the 
state, cooptation into the body politic has 
been elusive. 
A testing ground for the newly-found mettle 
of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
was the Portomaso project in St Julian’s in the 
late 1990s. Back then, the developers 
proposed the replacement of the existing 
Hilton hotel with a suite of buildings including 
a new 400-room hotel, apartments, offices, a 
yacht marina and a 21-floor tower block. 
Meanwhile, a 17th century historic wall would 
be destroyed, green areas removed, public 
space privatised, rare marine species 
threatened and traditional fishing practices 
jeopardised.20 The development was duly 
approved by the then Planning Authority, 
clearly supported by both the PN and PL and 
their appointees.21 The project was approved; 
it also set a precedent for various other high-
rise mega-villages that now characterise 
various parts of the Maltese landscape.22 The 
                                                          
20
 See, for instance E. Billiard (2014), ‘The 
privatisation of public spaces and the decline of 
urban connectivity in Paceville’, Omertaa: Journal 
of Applied Anthropology, 606-610, at 
http://www.omertaa.org/archive/omertaa0069.pd
f  
21
 J. Boissevain (2004), ‘Hotels, tuna pens, and civil 
society: contesting the foreshore in Malta’, in J. 
Boissevain and T. Selwyn (eds.), Contesting the 
foreshore: Tourism, society and politics on the 
coast, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 
pp. 233-260. 
22
 M. Briguglio (2011), ‘The problem with 
Portomaso’, The Times of Malta, Friday September 
30 2011, at 
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entire area (consisting of public land) was 
leased by the state to the developers for just 
191,000 Maltese Liri (almost €500,000 in 
today’s currency) until 2014, and would be 
eventually sold to the developers for 800,000 
Maltese Liri (about €2m) in 2006. 
Nevertheless, there were considerable 
objections from NGOs such as Moviment 
għall-Ambjent (the Movement for the 
Environment), the Society for the Study and 
Conservation of Nature, Graffiti, Alternattiva 
Demokratika, from residents and from 
individual experts, including the Planning 
Authority’s own Environmental Management 
Unit. The protests included a high-profile 
hunger strike in 1997 by two, then young 
activists, which was concluded only with the 
direct intervention of the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman. The latter’s intervention “… 
proved crucial in subsequent changes to the 
law, obliging government to seek Parliament's 
consent before passing public land to private 
interests”.23 This was a lesson as to how soft 
power could confront big government, even 
when the two political parties appeared in 
self-interested collusion. Indeed, various 
other development proposals were nipped in 
the bud with similar assemblages, involving 
                                                                                    
http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/2011
0930/opinion/The-problem-with-
Portomaso.387035 
23
 J. Debono (2013), ‘New Portomaso lagoon: how 
Tumas got its permit on appeal’, MaltaToday, 
Thursday 21 November 2013, at 
http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/3
1686/new-portomaso-lagoon-how-tumas-got-its-
permit-on-appeal-20131121#.U8hgZ7Gamdw  
NGO actions and media campaigns, signing of 
petitions, lobbying local politicians, and the 
occasional charismatic priest: as with the case 
of the Munxar, St Thomas Bay project in 1995, 
subsequently withdrawn by the developers.24 
Case studies 
Let me now turn to two other examples to 
explore, in some more detail, how multi-level 
initiatives and interests, within and beyond 
national government, can be, and have been, 
brought to bear to sway decision making and 
public policy in Malta. The first of these is the 
controversial International Investor 
Programme (IIP) proposed by the Labour 
Government in its 2014 Budget. The second 
case concerns the location of a Liquid Natural 
Gas (LNG)-storage vessel inside Marsaxlokk 
harbour.25 
Case One: Citizenship Scheme 
Malta’s Individual Investor Programme is now 
being touted as “the first programme of its 
kind to be recognised by the European 
                                                          
24
 Boissevain (2004), pp. 243-246. 
25
 Of course, there are many other examples of 
such multi-level governance politics. One other 
celebrated case dealt with the opposition of many 
local councils to the further development of the 
Sant Antnin waste treatment and recycling plant in 
Marsaskala (my home town). Here, the local 
councils took the issue to the European 
Commission and even tried to block the allocation 
of EU finding to the project. In this case, local/sub-
national entities flexed their (new) powers within 
the EU to (seek to) bypass the national 
government and attempt to block a local project 
by appealing to Brussels (e.g. The Malta 
Independent, 2010). This could well be the topic of 
a different research paper. 
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Commission”.26 But this status is the outcome 
of a fairly intense and drawn out debate that 
implicated the European Commission. 
 
Maltese citizenship by investment can now be 
granted under a legal amendment passed late 
in 2013. The programme provides for 
”affluent persons of impeccable standing and 
repute” to be naturalised and to receive 
Maltese citizenship on the basis of a 
contribution to and investment in Malta of at 
least €650,000 (plus €25,000 each for any 
spouse or minor). Such naturalised citizenship 
is for life and can be passed on to future 
generations by descent. So far, this scheme 
closely resembles those put in place by 
various other countries, and mainly small 
island states like Malta – including the 
Economic Citizenship Programme of 
Dominica27; or the one in St Kitts and Nevis, 
which has been in place since 1984 and claims 
to be the world’s oldest citizenship scheme.28 
The main difference, of course, is that, just 
                                                          
26
 The Editor (2014), Introduction to the Individual 
Investor Programme, at http://iip.gov.mt/ 
27
 Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica 
(2014), How do I apply for Economic Citizenship of 
the Commonwealth of Dominica?, at 
http://www.dominica.gov.dm/services/how-do-i-
apply-for-economic-citizenship-of-the-
commonwealth-of-dominica  
28
 Coldwell Banker St Kitts and Nevis (2014), 
Complete overview of St Kitts and Nevis citizenship 
schemes, at 
http://www.coldwellbankerstkittsnevis.com/page-
complete%2Boverview%2Bof%2Bst%2Bkitts%2Ban
d%2Bnevis%2Bcitizenship%2Bscheme%2Bwith%2B
complete%2Bbenefits-19.html 
like the Cyprus Investment Scheme,29 Maltese 
citizenship now also implies EU citizenship: 
and that is, let’s face it, perhaps the main 
attraction of this IIP. A Maltese passport 
would give applicants full voting rights on the 
archipelago and also the right to travel and 
settle freely within the European Union. 
 
The IIP idea was floated for the first time in 
the Labour Government’s 2013 budget 
speech. Criticism was immediate, starting 
with the PN Opposition and Alternattiva 
Demokratika and spilling over into all the 
media outlets. Concerns were raised about 
whether the scheme would damage or 
cheapen Malta’s international reputation, 
including that of being a reliable offshore 
finance centre; whether the scheme would 
indiscriminately entice shady characters to 
gain citizenship;30 whether the EU’s strict 
immigration and security laws would be 
compromised; whether beneficiaries of the IIP 
would have their identity protected; and 
whether citizenship could be granted without 
a clear residency requirement.  
 
The more heightened drama was reserved for 
the EU; and here the Maltese Government 
was exposed to a supra-national layer of 
                                                          
29
 Henley & Partners (2014), Cyprus Residency by 
Investment, at 
https://www.henleyglobal.com/residence-cyprus-
residence/  
30
 M. G. Vella (2013), Non-voting in Malta: Beyond 
tradition, mobilisation and partisan alignment, 
Unpublished PhD dissertation. Msida, Malta: 
University of Malta. 
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political pressure. On 16 January 2014, the 
European Parliament adopted a non-binding 
resolution criticizing the IIP legislation. The 
resolution was supported by all major political 
groups and adopted by an overwhelming 
majority of 560 votes (including the 2 Maltese 
MEPs elected from the PN ranks), with 22 
parliamentarians voting against (including the 
4 Maltese MEPs elected from the PL fold), 
with 44 abstentions.31 The resolution, and the 
debate that preceded it, flagged many 
concerns, but above all iterated the need for 
the “mutual trust” and loyal cooperation on 
which the EU is built, meaning the Maltese 
Government cannot unilaterally craft 
legislation that has clear implications on the 
other member states of the EU, and on the EU 
itself. Some dialogue and negotiation is 
necessary, even if citizenship issues are 
indeed ultimately within the full prerogative 
of national governments. That dialogue and 
negotiation did eventually take place. While 
the Maltese Government stuck to the scheme 
and eventually brandished the EU’s 
                                                          
31
 R. Bauböck (2014), European Parliament 
condemns EU citizenship for sale, at http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/1034-
european-parliament-debates-eu-citizenship-for-
sale; 
European Parliament (2014), European Parliament 
resolution of 16 January 2014 on EU citizenship for 
sale, 2013/2995(RSP), at http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/images/docs/EP-Malta-
news%2016%20January%202014.pdf; 
Citizenship for sale, live streaming of debate on EP 
Resolution on 16 January 2014, at 
mms://vodwms.europarl.europa.eu/wmv/nas/nas
vod01/vod0801/2014/wm/VODChapter_20140115
_17491000_19085300_-75f83b99143961aee26-
3fe7.wmv?wmcache=0 
endorsement as one of its selling points, it did 
so only after accepting to carry out various 
amendments to the scheme, including 
introducing a one-year residency requirement 
and removing the anonymity clause.32 Clearly, 
the days when the Maltese Government could 
proceed unilaterally, even on such matters 
that fall clearly within its national purview, as 
citizenship does, are over. Maltese politicians, 
whether in power or in opposition, are 
learning, through the IIP saga and similar 
experiences, how best to make the added 
layer of European decision making to work in 
their own interests. 
 
Case Two: Marsaxlokk and LPG storage 
The second illustrative case to present in this 
chapter is that of the location of a Liquid 
Natural Gas (LNG) storage vessel inside 
Marsaxlokk harbour. In this case, apart from 
the anticipated PL-PN showdown, the 
concerns were more localised, and involved 
various local players, including local councils, 
in the country’s south-east. 
 
Marsaxlokk Harbour is a classic example of 
land use conflict in a small island jurisdiction. 
The bay is the largest in the south-east and is 
the location of what is portrayed as Malta’s 
only traditional fishing village, attracting a 
                                                          
32
 M. Dalli (2014), ‘Malta, EC reach agreement on 
citizenship, Reding welcomes breakthrough’, 
MaltaToday, Wednesday 29 January 2014, at  
http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/printversion/360
17/#.U8kwILGamdw  
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steady stream of tourist day trippers to its 
open-air market and fish restaurants. Close by 
is the seaside town of Birżebbuġa with its 
Pretty Bay, a popular summer residence 
locale, apart from being a growing all-year-
round community in its own right. The area 
has, however, been gradually taking on a 
more ‘industrial’ look: the Malta Freeport set 
up operations there in the late 1980s, a 
project that involved considerable land 
reclamation. There are also fuel and liquid gas 
storage and bottling facilities at Bengħajsa. 
Aquaculture occupies part of the bay. But the 
major infrastructure in the area has been the 
Delimara Power Station, whose location 
generated considerable debate in the early 
1990s.33 
 
The plan to store liquid petroleum gas (LPG) 
for the Delimara power station in a ship 
permanently berthed in Marsaxlokk Bay 
alongside a new jetty has been described as 
“arguably the biggest political controversy of 
the day”.34 The current power station has 
been running on heavy fuel oil (HFO), and its 
conversion to cleaner natural gas enjoys wide 
                                                          
33
 B. Spiteri (2011), ‘Towards sustainable 
management of land and sea uses within the 
Marsaxlokk Bay area’, in A. Micallef (ed.), MCRR3-
2010 Conference Proceedings, Journal of Coastal 
Research, Special Issue, 61, 242–247.  
34
 J. Cordina (2014), ‘ISurvey: Passport scheme 
remains major concern; not so LNG tanker in 
Marsaxlokk’, The Malta Independent, Tuesday 11 
March 2014, at 
http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2014-
03-11/news/isurvey-passport-scheme-remains-
major-concern-not-so-lng-tankerin-marsaxlokk-
4216258561/  
popularity. The conversion is also meant to 
provide a better security of energy supply, 
cleaner air, diversification of the energy mix, a 
reduction in the national energy corporation’s 
generation costs and an ensuing reduction in 
energy tariffs. Expert reports were 
commissioned by all sides, and came up 
(predictably) with different risk and hazard 
scenarios. The national Fishers’ Cooperative, 
environmental watchdog Din L-Art Ħelwa and 
Alternattiva Demokratika all criticised the 
decision and have instead suggested a ship 
anchored outside harbour as a safer 
arrangement, as has the PN Opposition.35 No 
maritime impact assessment was carried out 
and a comprehensive risk assessment remains 
pending. Nevertheless, the Malta 
Environment and Planning Authority (MEPA) 
approved the project at a gruelling, eight-hour 
sitting on March 24 2014.36 
 
The interesting feature of this issue in relation 
to the question of governance is that 
concerning the local councils. The two local 
councils in the immediate area, Marsaxlokk 
and Birżebbuġa, as well as the council of 
Marsaskala, an adjoining locality, all have 
healthy Labour Party majorities: 6 PL 
                                                          
35
 M. De Marco (2014), ‘Safety first at Marsaxlokk’, 
The Times of Malta, Friday March 21 2014, at 
http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/2014
0321/opinion/Safety-first-at-Marsaxlokk.511495  
36
 K. Sansone (2014), ‘MEPA approves power 
station, gas storage facility permits’, The Times of 
Malta, Monday March 24 2014, at 
http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/2014
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storage-facility-permits.511954  
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councillors and 1 PN councillor in Birżebbuġa; 
4 PL councillors and 1 PN councillor in 
Marsaxlokk; and 6 PL councillors and 3 PN 
councillors in Marsaskala.37 They all 
nonetheless expressed concern with the 
offshore but in-bay storage facility and its 
health and safety issues; here they were 
respecting the concerns of their residents 
(and voters), a “vast majority” of whom 
wanted to see the gas storage infrastructure 
located outside Marsaxlokk harbour.38 This 
development is quite exceptional in Maltese 
politics, and the Labour Government has 
found itself in an awkward situation, unable 
to assume that sympathetic local councils 
would simply fall in line with its plans. 
Therefore, while unwilling to appear weak in 
the face of the demands of the PN opposition, 
the PL government, including the prime 
minister, made overtures to the respective 
local councils, offering honourable 
concessions that would enable them to 
support the conversion plans. These included 
guarantees that the LPG storage vessel would 
be removed as soon as a longer-term solution 
– a gas pipeline from Sicily, built with EU finds 
would be in place,39 an option that had indeed 
                                                          
37
 The Editor (2014), Local Councils as Pathway to 
Parliament, at 
http://www.um.edu.mt/__data/assets/excel_doc/
0009/207387/tr-newpath.xls 
38
 J. Debono (2014), ‘Residents prefer offshore 
terminal: Delimara gas plant EIA’, MaltaToday. 
Monday 6 January 2014, at 
http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/printversion/328
72/#.U8p1krGamdw 
39
 The Editor (2014), ‘Muscat tells Marsaxlokk 
residents LNG tanker is not permanent’, 
been also proposed by the Marsaxlokk local 
council.40 The three councils eventually fell in 
line and supported the government’s interim 
plans but, in the process, the councils had 
secured direct interest from and consultation 
with national-level politicians who could not 
afford to neglect their views and concerns.41 
 
Conclusion: What is past is prologue 
Malta has come a long way. The levels of 
governance have been expanding in recent 
decades; the number of players involved in 
lobbying decision-makers is increasing; a 
unilateral stance by government increasingly 
unlikely. to At the time of writing (July 2014), 
50 years after gaining independence, 40 years 
after ditching the monarchical constitution, 20 
years after having introduced local councils, 
                                                                                    
MaltaToday, Wednesday 14 May 2014, at 
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40
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Independent, Saturday 22 March 2014, at 
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41
 The Editor (2014), ‘Il-power station il-ġdida: Il-
Gvern għandu jiddiskuti mas-Sindki tan-naħa t'isfel 
ta' Malta dwar it-tanker tal-ħażna tal-gass‘ *The 
new power station: Government should discuss 
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region], MaltaRightNow, Saturday 8 February 
2014, at 
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and 10 years after having acceded to the EU, 
the situation in Malta is one where absolutist 
government is well nigh impossible – to the 
government’s chagrin, and in spite of healthy 
parliamentary majority by the incumbent 
(Labour) government.42 Even the largely 
ceremonial office of the President of the 
Republic is now engaged in some interesting 
‘social policy’ work.43 
 
Indeed,  if the trend towards multi-focal 
power and multi-level governance continues 
in Malta, then perhaps this hitherto 
unassailable position of the ruling political 
party in a mono-cameral Parliament – and 
which makes short shrift of any ‘division of 
powers’ between the executive and the 
legislative – may be the last to fall victim to 
this wave of sweeping change. We are already 
witnessing some early signs of political 
decoupling or de-alignment  with less people 
voting in general elections, and more voters 
willing to switch allegiance from one party to 
another in such elections, to the 
consternation of the two main political 
parties.44 Europeanisation is definitely part of 
this transformative trend – dare we call it 
democratisation? But Malta’s welcome 
                                                          
42
 D. Fenech (2013), ‘The 2013 Maltese General 
Election: unplugging the blockage’, West European 
Politics, 36(5), 1088-1094. 
43
 The Editor (2014), ‘New President to have 
consultative role on social policy matters’, The 
Times of Malta, Tuesday 1 April 2014, at 
http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/2014
0401/local/new-president-to-have-consultative-
role-on-social-policy-matters.513111 
44
 See, for instance, Vella, op. cit. 
evolution away from ‘total politics’ is another 
condition that has generated its own 
momentum. 
 
   
  
17 
 
Bibliography 
 
Baldacchino, G. (2012), ‘Islands and despots’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 50(1), 103-
120. 
Baldacchino, G. (2006), ‘Hands off local governance’, The Times of Malta, Wednesday January 25 
2006, at http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20060125/opinion/hands-off-local-
governance.65365  
Baldacchino, G. (2002), ‘A nationless state? Malta, national identity and the EU’, West European 
Politics, 25(4), 191-206. 
Barnes, J. A. (1954), Class and committees in a Norwegian island parish. New York: Plenum Press. 
Bauböck, R. (2014), European Parliament condemns EU citizenship for sale, at http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/1034-european-parliament-debates-eu-citizenship-for-sale  
Bezzina, J. (2011), ‘The rise and fall of Gozo’s civic council’, The Times of Malta, Tuesday July 19 
2011, at http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20110719/life-features/The-rise-and-fall-of-
Gozo-s-civic-council.376331  
Billiard, E. (2014), ‘The privatisation of public spaces and the decline of urban connectivity in 
Paceville’, Omertaa: Journal of Applied Anthropology, 606-610, at 
http://www.omertaa.org/archive/omertaa0069.pdf  
Boissevain, J. (2010), ‘Tourists, developers and civil society: on the commodification of Malta’s 
landscapes’, in J. Scott and T. Selwyn (eds.), Thinking through tourism, Oxford: Berg, pp. 93-116. 
Boissevain, J. (2004), ‘Hotels, tuna pens, and civil society: contesting the foreshore in Malta’, in J. 
Boissevain and T. Selwyn (eds.), Contesting the foreshore: Tourism, society and politics on the coast,,  
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 233-260. 
Boissevain, J. (1993), Saints and fireworks: Religion and politics in rural Malta, Valletta, Malta: 
Progress Press. 
Briguglio, M. (2011), ‘The problem with Portomaso’, The Times of Malta,  Friday September 30 2011, 
at http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20110930/opinion/The-problem-with-
Portomaso.387035 
Buker, P. E. (2005), ‘The executive administrative style in Prince Edward Island: managerial and spoils 
politics’, in M. Howlett, L. Bernier and K. Brownsey (eds.), Executive styles in Canada: cabinet 
structures and leadership practices in Canadian government, Toronto ON: University of Toronto 
Press, pp. 111-131. 
Cini, M. (2002), ‘A divided nation: polarization and the two-party system in Malta’, South European 
Society & Politics, 7(1), 6-23. 
   
  
18 
 
Citizenship for sale, live streaming of debate on EP Resolution on 16 January 2014, at 
mms://vodwms.europarl.europa.eu/wmv/nas/nasvod01/vod0801/2014/wm/VODChapter_2014011
5_17491000_19085300_-75f83b99143961aee26-3fe7.wmv?wmcache=0 
Coldwell Banker St Kitts and Nevis (2014), Complete overview of St Kitts and Nevis citizenship 
schemes, at http://www.coldwellbankerstkittsnevis.com/page-
complete%2Boverview%2Bof%2Bst%2Bkitts%2Band%2Bnevis%2Bcitizenship%2Bscheme%2Bwith%2
Bcomplete%2Bbenefits-19.html  
Cordina, J. (2014), ‘ISurvey: Passport scheme remains major concern; not so LNG tanker in 
Marsaxlokk’, The Malta Independent, Tuesday 11 March 2014, at 
http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2014-03-11/news/isurvey-passport-scheme-remains-
major-concern-not-so-lng-tankerin-marsaxlokk-4216258561/  
Dalli, M. (2014), ‘Malta, EC reach agreement on citizenship, Reding welcomes breakthrough’, 
MaltaToday, Wednesday 29 January 2014, at  
http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/printversion/36017/#.U8kwILGamdw  
De Marco, M. (2014), ‘Safety first at Marsaxlokk’, The Times of Malta, Friday March 21 2014, at 
http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20140321/opinion/Safety-first-at-Marsaxlokk.511495  
Debono, J. (2014), ‘Residents prefer offshore terminal: Delimara gas plant EIA’, MaltaToday. Monday 
6 January 2014, at http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/printversion/32872/#.U8p1krGamdw 
Debono, J. (2013), ‘New Portomaso lagoon: how Tumas got its permit on appeal’, MaltaToday, 
Thursday 21 November 2013, at http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/31686/new-
portomaso-lagoon-how-tumas-got-its-permit-on-appeal-20131121#.U8hgZ7Gamdw  
The Editor (2014), ‘Il-power station il-ġdida: Il-Gvern għandu jiddiskuti mas-Sindki tan-naħa t'isfel ta' 
Malta dwar it-tanker tal-ħażna tal-gass‘ *The new power station: Government should discuss the LPG 
tanker issue with the local councils of the region], MaltaRightNow, Saturday 8 February 2014, at 
http://herbert.maltarightnow.com/Default.asp?module=news&at=Il-
Gvern+g%26%23295%3Bandu+jiddiskuti+mas-Sindki+tan-
na%26%23295%3Ba+t%27isfel+ta%27+Malta+dwar+it-tanker+tal-
%26%23295%3Ba%26%23380%3Bna+tal-gass&t=a&aid=99854175&cid=19  
The Editor (2014), Introduction to the Individual Investor Programme, at http://iip.gov.mt/ 
The Editor (2014), Local Councils as Pathway to Parliament, at 
http://www.um.edu.mt/__data/assets/excel_doc/0009/207387/tr-newpath.xls 
The Editor (2014), ‘Marsaxlokk council says change from HFO to gas ‘positive’’, The Malta 
Independent, Saturday 22 March 2014, at http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2014-03-
22/news/mxlokk-council-says-change-from-hfo-to-gas-positive-4343169025/ 
The Editor (2014), ‘Muscat tells Marsaxlokk residents LNG tanker is not permanent’, MaltaToday, 
Wednesday 14 May 2014, at 
http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/europe_2014/39005/muscat_tells_marsaxlokk_residents_ln
g_tanker_is_not_permanent_#.U8ptd7Gamdw  
   
  
19 
 
The Editor (2014), ‘New President to have consultative role on social policy matters’, The Times of 
Malta, Tuesday 1 April 2014, at http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20140401/local/new-
president-to-have-consultative-role-on-social-policy-matters.513111  
The Editor (2014), Number of Council Members, by Party and Locality, at 
http://www.um.edu.mt/__data/assets/excel_doc/0006/207384/tr-majsize.xls 
The Editor (2012), ‘Labour takes umbrage at new independent mayor, accuses PN of being ‘anti-
democratic’’, MaltaToday, Tuesday 7 August 2012, at 
http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/20160/labour-accuses-pn-of-being-anti-democratic-
20120807#.U8vLMLGamdw  
The Editor (2010), ‘Sant’ Antnin: €27m Plant opened after four-year uphill battle’, The Malta 
Independent, Friday 26 November 2010, at http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2010-11-
26/news/sant-antnin-27m-plant-opened-after-four-year-uphill-battle-283839/  
The Editor (2009), ‘Should Malta have one national day?’, MaltaToday, Sunday March 29 2009, at 
http://archive.maltatoday.com.mt/2009/03/29/t14.html   
European Parliament (2014), European Parliament resolution of 16 January 2014 on EU citizenship 
for sale, 2013/2995(RSP), at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/images/docs/EP-Malta-
news%2016%20January%202014.pdf 
Fenech, D. (2013), ‘The 2013 Maltese General Election: unplugging the blockage’, West European 
Politics, 36(5), 1088-1094. 
Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica (2014), How do I apply for Economic Citizenship of 
the Commonwealth of Dominica?, at http://www.dominica.gov.dm/services/how-do-i-apply-for-
economic-citizenship-of-the-commonwealth-of-dominica  
Henley & Partners (2014), Cyprus Residency by Investment, at 
https://www.henleyglobal.com/residence-cyprus-residence/  
Hirczy, W. (1995), ‘Explaining near‐universal turnout: the case of Malta’, European Journal of Political 
Research, 27(2), 255-272. 
Hooghe, L., and Marks, G. (2003), ‘Unravelling the central state, but how? Types of multi-level 
governance’, American Political Science Review, 97(2), 233-243.  
Hyden, G. (1983), No shortcuts to progress: African development management in perspective, 
London: Heinemann. 
Micallef, J. V. (1979), ‘Mediterranean maverick: Malta’s uncertain future’, The Round Table: 
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 69(275), 238-251. 
Myrdal, G. (1968), Asian drama: An inquiry into the poverty of nations, New York: Twentieth Century 
Fund.  
Piattoni, S. (2009), ‘Multi‐level governance: a historical and conceptual analysis’, European 
Integration, 31(2), 163-180. 
   
  
20 
 
Richards, J. (1982), ‘Politics in small independent communities: conflict or consensus?’, Journal of 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 20(2), 155-171. 
Sansone, K. (2014), ‘MEPA approves power station, gas storage facility permits’, The Times of Malta, 
Monday March 24 2014, at http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20140324/local/mepa-
approves-power-station-gas-storage-facility-permits.511954  
Siaroff, A. (2003), ‘Spurious majorities, electoral systems and electoral system change’, 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 41(2), 143-160. 
Spiteri, B. (2011), ‘Towards sustainable management of land and sea uses within the Marsaxlokk Bay 
area’, in A. Micallef (ed.), MCRR3-2010 Conference Proceedings, Journal of Coastal Research, Special 
Issue, 61, 242–247.  
Vella, M. (2013), ‘Prime Minister: Aliyev would not pass IIP due diligence’, Eurasia Internet. 
Wednesday 13 November 2013, at http://www.neweurasia.info/en/index.php/events-and-
opinions/844-prime-minister-aliyev-would-not-pass-iip-due-diligence  
Vella, M. G. (2013), Non-voting in Malta: Beyond tradition, mobilisation and partisan alignment, 
Unpublished PhD dissertation. Msida, Malta: University of Malta. 
Wriggins, W. H. (1975), ‘To the highest bidder: Malta, Britain and NATO’, The Round Table: 
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 65(258), 167-185. 
 
 
 
 
